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I. INTRODUCTION 
“State of mind” is an important disputed element in criminal tri-
als when defendants seek to prove affirmatively that they did not have 
the “guilty” state of mind required by the charged crime.  One type of 
exculpatory evidence they offer is hearsay statements, made by the 
defendants themselves, expressing their own then-existing state of 
mind.  Such statements, if relevant to prove the defendant’s mental 
state at the time of the alleged crime, are putatively admissible under 
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 803(3).  As this Article will demon-
strate, however, courts are consistently re-interpreting FRE 803(3) to 
exclude defendants’ own exculpatory state of mind statements that 
are “post-crime,” made any time after the charged crime was commit-
ted. 
This Article critiques the practice of excluding defendants’ post-
crime state of mind hearsay.  It does so by applying the basic princi-
ples of narrative theory, a theory of jury decision-making which is ex-
plored in this Symposium.  Part II describes how state of mind hear-
say, including the allegedly “untrustworthy” statements made by 
criminal defendants, is admissible under the categorical definition of 
FRE 803(3).  Parts III and IV present the basic principles of narrative 
theory.  These principles demonstrate that defendants’ state of mind 
hearsay can have high probative value and can be important for de-
fendants in constructing a plausible alternative to the prosecution’s 
narrative of guilt and guiltiness. Part V critiques the “timeliness test” 
that courts have added into FRE 803(3) and presents the results of 
case law research which shows how this test can exclude virtually all 
criminal defendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay. Part VI uses 
specific cases to illustrate how exclusion of such hearsay statements 
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can impoverish the defense and put criminal defendants at a disad-
vantage within the framework of narrative theory. 
This Article assumes that the principles of narrative theory are a 
valid explanation of a crucial aspect of jury decision-making.  Under 
this assumption, these principles are used here to shed new light on a 
specific problem of evidence law.  Part VII concludes this Article by 
exploring larger questions about narrative theory: whether it simply 
casts old arguments about evidence law into new terms; whether its 
insights into jury decision-making contribute new understanding of 
how best to regulate the admission of evidence; or whether this the-
ory demands a radical re-conception of the law of evidence itself. 
II. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO  
STATE OF MIND HEARSAY UNDER FRE 803(3) 
FRE 803(3), the hearsay exception for statements of then-
existing state of mind and physical condition, reads as follows: 
Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immate-
rial 
 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though 
the declarant is available as a witness: 
. . . . 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A 
statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, 
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, de-
sign, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identifica-
tion, or terms of declarant’s will.1
The exception appears to be “categorical,” requiring courts to admit 
a hearsay statement when it falls within the exception’s category of 
admissible statements, defined by relatively bright-line terms.  One 
attribute of this categorical approach is that it curtails the “discretion” 
of trial court judges to admit or exclude hearsay on the basis of the 
judge’s opinion of the trustworthiness of individual witnesses or hear-
say declarants.  Thus, if a criminal defendant offers evidence of her 
own out-of-court statement about her then-existing state of mind, the 
statement should be admitted if it is relevant.2
 1 FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
 2 FRE 403 should not be used to exclude hearsay based on judicial assessment 
on the hearsay declarant’s lack of trustworthiness.  Assessment of the declarant’s tes-
timonial qualities, particularly sincerity, is “a function reserved for the trier of fact.”  
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 7044, at 440 n. 15; 
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A defendant’s exculpatory statements of state of mind made dur-
ing the commission of an alleged crime might be relevant to prove 
that the defendant had an “innocent” mental state at the crucial 
time—when the crime was committed.  They could reveal, for exam-
ple, lack of intent, lack of knowledge, and lack of agreement.  In ad-
dition, statements made either before or after the commission of the 
alleged crime could also be relevant to prove the defendant’s mental 
state when the crime was committed.  Courts admit such statements 
for this purpose based on a reasonable inference of continuity of the 
mental state forward or backward in time.3  When the state of mind 
issue is important in a criminal case, given the difficulty of rebutting a 
factfinder’s assumption that most people intend the consequences of 
their acts, a defendant’s own statements expressing her then-existing 
state of mind could be pertinent, perhaps even powerful, data for the 
jury. 
The classic case employing the categorical approach to FRE 
803(3) involves a criminal defendant’s proffer of his own statement 
of then-existing state of mind, made during or immediately after the 
alleged crime.  United States v. DiMaria,4 an opinion written by Judge 
Henry Friendly, concerned a statement made by defendant DiMaria 
when he was arrested in possession of a half-case of stolen cigarettes.  
The crime charged required proof that the defendant “knew” the 
cigarettes were stolen; the defendant claimed that he thought they 
were “bootleg,” from a low tax state, rather than stolen.  His state-
ment to the arresting FBI agents was: “I thought you guys were just 
investigating white collar crime; what are you doing here?  I only 
came here to get some cigarettes real cheap.”5  This statement was in-
terpreted by the court as the equivalent of “I am here” to get cheap 
cigarettes, “a statement of what he was thinking in the present.”6  
Judge Friendly’s opinion reversed DiMaria’s conviction, based on the 
finding that the district court’s exclusion of this statement under FRE 
803(3) was error.  The government had objected to admission of Di-
Maria’s hearsay, contending that it was “an absolutely classic false ex-
culpatory statement.”7  Judge Friendly rejected this contention as 
see also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 270, at 248 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 
2006). 
 3 MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 274, at 270–71.  
 4 727 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 5 Id. at 270. 
 6 Id. at 271. The prosecution conceded the validity of this interpretation.  See id. 
 7 Id.  
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grounds to exclude the statement and endorsed the categorical ap-
proach of the Federal Rules of Evidence as follows: 
False it may well have been but if it fell within Rule 803(3), as it 
clearly did if the words of that Rule are read to mean what they 
say, its truth or falsity was for the jury to determine 
. . . The Advisers’ Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem, en-
dorses Professor Chadbourn’s criticism of § 63(4)(c) of the 
Commissioner’s proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence, saying, 
“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it 
has been described as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary . . . .’” 
     It is doubtless true that all the hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 
and 804 rest on a belief that declarations of the sort there de-
scribed have “some particular assurance of credibility . . . .”  But 
the scheme of the Rules is to determine that issue by categories; if 
a declaration comes within a category defined as an exception, 
the declaration is admissible without any preliminary finding of 
probable credibility by the judge, save for the “catch-all” excep-
tions of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and the business records 
exception of Rule 803(6) . . . even though this excludes certain 
hearsay statements with a high degree of trustworthiness and ad-
mits certain statements with a low one.  This evil was doubtless 
thought preferable to requiring preliminary determinations of 
the judge with respect to trustworthiness, with attendant possibili-
ties of delay, prejudgment and encroachment on the province of 
the jury.  There is a peculiarly strong case for admitting state-
ments like [defendant’s], however suspect, when the Government 
is relying on the presumption of guilty knowledge arising from a 
defendant’s possession of the fruits of a crime recently after its 
commission.8
Judge Friendly’s opinion is a strong statement of hearsay policy 
in favor of the categorical approach to the admission of hearsay.  I 
have previously endorsed the categorical approach to FRE 803(3), as 
opposed to a judicially-created doctrine permitting judges to exclude 
criminal defendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay on grounds of 
untrustworthiness.9  My critique of this judicially-created doctrine, 
which I call the “timeliness test,” is discussed in Part V. 
This Article presents a new argument in favor of the categorical 
approach to FRE 803(3).  It is that the narrative theory of jury deci-
sion-making, including the story model, the Supreme Court opinion 
in Old Chief v. United States,10 and the relative plausibility theory, 
 8 Id. at 271–72 (internal citations omitted). 
 9 See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, The Problem of “Trustworthiness” in the Admission of State of 
Mind Hearsay Under California and Federal Evidence Law, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 619 (2008). 
 10 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
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strongly support the admission of defendants’ post-crime hearsay 
statements of state of mind.  Admission increases the probative value 
of a defendant’s narrative, helps to satisfy the criteria that determine 
the jury’s choice of the “best” story, and fulfills the need for compet-
ing stories that increase the efficacy of decision-making according to 
the story model.  Had Judge Friendly been guided by the precepts of 
narrative theory, his decision on the admissibility of DiMaria’s state-
ment would have been exactly the same, although justified in very dif-
ferent terms. 
III. STATE OF MIND IS “CONSTRUCTED”  
WITHIN A NARRATIVE FRAMEWORK AT TRIAL 
A criminal defendant’s state of mind at the time of the alleged 
crime—defendant’s “past mental state”—is a “constructed fact” be-
cause it can be known only through acts of interpretation by the deci-
sion-maker.  Its “factual status is epistemically different from (and less 
clear than) exterior ‘facts in the world,’ and [is] generally insepara-
ble from normative evaluations of responsibility and guilt.”11  Con-
tributors to this Symposium agree.12  The mental states that are sali-
ent in criminal prosecutions illustrate why this is so.  According to 
Professor Christopher Slobogin, proving the routine state of mind 
elements in criminal law, not even counting insanity and other forms 
of diminished capacity, poses some very difficult questions: 
Did the defendant “know” or “appreciate” that his conduct at the 
time of the offense was wrong?  Was he “compelled” to commit 
the criminal act? Did the defendant “premeditate” the crime?  
Was she aware of the risks her conduct posed?  Did the defendant 
really feel that harm was imminent and that violence was the only 
way to prevent it?13
 11 D. Michael Risinger, Introduction, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 885 (2008). 
 12 Professor Keith Findley calls these “softer questions of truth” that are “norma-
tive, value-laden judgments.”  Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, 
Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 894 2008).  Profes-
sor Christopher Slobogin asserts that past mental states are not objective facts that 
can be proved in the way that occurrences of acts can be.  CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, 
PROVING THE UNPROVABLE 43 (2007).  “[N]arrative thinking dominates attempts to re-
construct mental state.”  Id. at 44.  And Professor Andrew Taslitz describes the proc-
ess of narrative thinking: “When jurors name a mental state as ‘premeditation,’ ‘heat 
of passion,’ or a ‘belief in the imminent need to use deadly force in self-defense,’ 
they are crafting an interpretation that partly embodies their own assumptions, atti-
tudes, and beliefs.”  Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: 
Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 26 (1998). 
 13 SLOBOGIN, supra note 12, at 44. 
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The normative content of the state of mind element is obvious in 
crimes such as “knowing and willful preparation of false tax returns,” 
“knowing and voluntary furtherance of a conspiracy to bring aliens 
into the United States,” “predisposition to engage in criminal con-
duct,” and “conspiracy to possess drugs with intent to distribute.”14 
Fact finding about such states of mind requires a “contextually rich 
environment”15 of evidentiary facts, including detail about the crime, 
the events leading up to it and about the defendant herself.  And be-
cause the state of mind issue encompasses normative evaluations of 
responsibility and guilt, the use of “narrative context” and “partisan 
adversary rhetoric”16 to prove it can be justified. 
Proving the state of mind issue within a narrative context is not 
only epistemically effective, it is currently understood to be a neces-
sary part of decision-making in criminal trials.  There is considerable 
agreement that jury members construct facts and make determina-
tions of “what happened” by evaluating evidence within the frame-
work of a story, or narrative account, of the events central to the 
charged crime.  This “narrative theory” of jury decision-making is 
founded on empirical work of social scientists, and it has been further 
investigated and refined by researchers and commentators who ac-
cept this basic view of how juries make decisions within the adversary 
system.17
 14 These examples are drawn from the cases discussed in Part V, in which defen-
dants’ post-crime hearsay statements of state of mind were excluded as untrust-
worthy.  See infra note 74. 
 15 D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial 
and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1295 (2004). 
 16 Id. at 1299, 1301.  See also W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM 57–61 (1981) (using two cases to illus-
trate how normative understandings and aesthetic judgments of excusable and inex-
cusable behavior are based on contextual facts). 
 17 There is a vast literature on narrative and the law in general which is not di-
rectly pertinent to this Article. Much of it is cited in John B. Mitchell, Evaluating 
Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A Proposal for Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599, 608–13 
(2005).  I use the term “narrative theory” to refer to a limited portion of that litera-
ture which focuses on how narrative framework shapes decision-making at trial.  Ma-
jor sources include ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 
110–42 (2000); BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 16; ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF 
THE TRIAL (1999); REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE 
JURY 22–23, 163–64 (1983); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of 
Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519  (1991); Doron Me-
nashe & Mutal E. Shamash, The Narrative Fallacy, 3 INT’L COMMENT. EVID. 6–8 (2006); 
Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004) (presenting cognitive theories derived from an emerg-
ing body of research called coherence-based reasoning). 
Different commentators use different terms to describe their explanation of 
narrative theory: the story model (Pennington & Hastie), a theory of story construc-
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What is a “narrative” or “story” in the context of a criminal trial?  
Put simply by Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, authors of a series 
of articles and books presenting their research and conclusions about 
the “story model” of juror cognition and decision-making: 
Stories involve human action sequences connected by relation-
ships of physical causality and intentional causality . . . . Stories 
appear to be organized into units that are often called episodes  
. . . . [E]pisode[s] should contain events which fulfill particular 
roles and are connected by certain types of causal relationships.18
Jurors construct stories from “case specific information acquired dur-
ing the trial, . . . [generalized background] knowledge about events 
similar in content to those that are the topic of dispute, . . . and ge-
neric expectations about what makes a complete story.”19  At the end 
of this process of evaluating the evidence, jurors will usually accept 
one story as the “best” account of “what happened.”20  Finally, at the 
decision-making stage, jurors will learn from judicial instructions the 
verdict definitions that are available to them. They will then “match” 
the story they have accepted with the verdict definitions.  This is “a 
tion and social judgment (Bennett and Feldman), narrative (Amsterdam & Bruner).  
There is, however, strong consensus on how a narrative framework works to enable 
jurors to make sense of the information presented to them at trial and how compet-
ing narratives frame their decisions about “what happened.”  It is this consensus that 
I rely on in this Article and that I refer to as “narrative theory.”  When commenta-
tors’ individual views are discussed in this Article, I refer to them specifically. 
 18 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 525.  Amsterdam and Bruner offer the 
following description of the “inherent structure” of stories:  
[H]uman-like characters . . . capable of willing their own actions, form-
ing intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings . . . a plot with a begin-
ning, a middle and an end [which] requires . . . (1) an initial steady 
state . . . (2) that gets disrupted by Trouble . . . (3) . . . evoking efforts 
at redress or transformation, which succeed or fail, (4) so that the old 
steady state is restored or . . . transformed . . . . 
Stories conclude by drawing out a relationship between the tale that was told and the 
act of telling it, for example a “moral of the story.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 
17, at 113–14. 
Bennett and Feldman describe the function of stories as follows:  
Stories are everyday communication devices that create interpretive 
contexts for social action . . . . [P]eople use stories as a means of con-
veying selective interpretations of social behavior to others . . . . The 
overriding judgmental tasks in a [criminal] trial involve constructing 
an interpretation for the defendant’s alleged activities and determining 
how that interpretation fits into the set of legal criteria that must be 
applied to the defendant’s behavior.   
BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
 19 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 522. 
 20 Id. at 527. 
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classification process in which the best match between the accepted 
story’s features and verdict category features is determined.”21
According to Professors Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman, 
“This theory of stories . . . explains how ordinary persons can make 
sophisticated judgments about complex information even in situa-
tions, like the courtroom, in which there are few familiar formal cues 
to guide the process.”22  The framework of a story provides an analyti-
cal device that is necessary to the basic tasks of the decision-maker, 
which are as follows: to “organize and reorganize large amounts of 
constantly changing information” that is presented through “conflict-
ing testimony, disorienting time lapses, . . . the perspectives of many 
witnesses and experts, and a confusing array of subplots”; to keep 
“the focus of attention on the alleged criminal behavior in a case and 
. . . [to bring] the bulk of the supporting information to bear on the 
interpretation of that behavior”; to “enable people to make systematic 
comparisons between stories” that can satisfy the normative standards 
of fairness, objectivity, and the test of reasonable doubt”; and to 
“produce interpretations that can be categorized easily within the le-
gal statutes that apply to a case.”23 
 21 Id. at 530. The story model has been broadly accepted within cognitive psy-
chology, although much of its theorizing remains untested: 
The model is an extension of basic research on the cognitive represen-
tation of narrative information . . . . The story model is a psychologi-
cally plausible account of juror decisionmaking, and it is the only 
model in which serious consideration is given to the role of memory 
processes during trial, but more research is needed to establish its pre-
dictive validity and heuristic value for generating testable hypotheses. 
Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCI. 1046, 1047 
(1989).  According to Professor Dan Simon, “[c]oherence research fits with the story 
model . . . . Inferences . . . are based on constructed representations of coherence, 
and it is these constructed representations that ultimately determine the verdicts.”  
Simon, supra note 17, at 563.  Professor Simon also contends that coherence theory is 
more broadly applicable than the story model insofar as it extends beyond narratives 
of “human intentionality” to which, he asserts, the story model is confined.  Id. at 
564. 
Other researchers believe that the final stage of verdict selection may not be as 
simple as that portrayed in the story model.  They have developed a theory of “paral-
lel constraint satisfaction modeling of deliberative coherence” which allows jurors to 
“attempt to address multiple goals that compete to be satisfied.  Verdict options [in 
civil cases] . . . may be used by legal decision makers . . . simultaneously to fulfill 
compensatory, expressive, punishment, deterrence, distributive justice and moral 
cleansing goals along with other normative and non-normative goals.”  Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, John M. Darley & Robert J. MacCoun, Symbolism and Incommensurability 
in Civil Sanctioning: Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1154, 
1157 (2003). 
 22 BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 64. 
 23 Id. at 8–10. 
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When defendants offer their own state of mind hearsay state-
ments to prove that they had an “innocent” state of mind at the time 
of the alleged crime—that is, a state of mind that did not satisfy the 
legal definition of a “guilty” state of mind—typically this state of mind 
fits within a larger story of “what happened.”  The DiMaria case ex-
emplifies this.  The relevance of DiMaria’s state of mind hearsay (“I 
only came here to get cigarettes real cheap”) is that it tends to show 
that he believed the cigarettes in his trunk were bootleg, not stolen, 
which would then decrease the probability that he “knew” they were 
stolen, an essential element of the crime charged.  The probative 
value of DiMaria’s hearsay statement for the jury would depend on 
how it related to the entire body of evidence admitted at trial.  Di-
Maria’s story that he thought the cigarettes were bootleg might have 
been buttressed by other facts indicating what DiMaria “knew,”24 
other statements of DiMaria’s intent, or his past behavior regarding 
bootleg cigarettes.  Under narrative theory, the probative value of his 
statement would not be evaluated atomistically.  Within the context 
of the larger narrative, DiMaria’s exclamation to the FBI might not 
have seemed like a “classic false exculpatory statement.” 25  Part IV 
explains why this is so. 
IV. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NARRATIVE THEORY  
SUPPORT THE ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT’S STATE OF MIND HEARSAY 
Three basic principles underlie the successful functioning of the 
narrative theory of decision-making.  First, effective story construction 
requires specific, concrete facts.  Then, the criteria for choosing the 
“best” story assume that the decision-maker has access to a rich array 
of evidence.  Finally, objective and fair outcomes are more likely to be 
achieved when there are alternative competing stories which the de-
 24 The prosecution’s case against DiMaria was circumstantial.  See United States v. 
DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 267–68 (2nd Cir. 1989).  Eight days after a truckload of ciga-
rettes had been stolen, DiMaria was seen at his social club walking and talking with 
men who the FBI knew had custody of the stolen truckload.  Id. at 267.  The stolen 
cigarettes were transferred into a series of trailers which were finally stored and 
guarded in a truck yard.  Id. at 268.  On the afternoon of DiMaria’s arrest, he arrived 
at the yard and helped unload the cigarettes from the trailers into a van.  Id.  This is 
DiMaria’s only observed incriminating act before he drove out of the yard with the 
half-case of cigarettes in his trunk and was immediately arrested.  Id.  More incrimi-
nating was a document seized from another co-defendant which indicated that Di-
Maria may have received fifty cases of the cigarettes as they were being transferred 
between trailers the day before the arrest.  Id. The Second Circuit opinion does not 
describe any defense evidence other than the statement DiMaria made to the arrest-
ing FBI officer.  See id. at 270. 
 25 Id. at 271. 
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cision-maker tests against each other in determining which story fits 
best with the available evidence.  All three principles demonstrate the 
high probative value of defendants’ state of mind hearsay and justify 
its admission into evidence. 
A. Specific and Concrete Evidentiary Facts Have Probative Value 
Beyond the Linear Proof of an Essential Element 
Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Old Chief v. United States26 has 
been interpreted as an implicit acknowledgement that a narrative 
framework underlies jury decision-making in criminal trials.  Com-
mentators agree that the opinion places the Supreme Court’s impri-
matur on the prosecution’s ability to use evidence in order to help 
“tell an involving and coherent story.”27  The opinion itself discusses 
two reasons why effects on narrative increase the probative value of 
proffered items of evidence. 
Justice Souter calls these narrative effects “evidentiary richness” 
and “narrative integrity.”28  In explaining evidentiary richness, Justice 
Souter makes two points: (1) a single specific, concrete item of evi-
dence can increase (or decrease) the probability of several issues 
and/or essential elements in a case, and thus has probative value “be-
yond any linear scheme of reasoning”;29 (2) specific and concrete 
items of evidence have probative value simply by telling a more color-
ful story, thereby adding to the momentum of the narrative, and, 
more controversially, increasing “the willingness of the jurors to draw 
the inferences . . . not just to prove a fact but to establish its human 
significance . . . and so to implicate the law’s moral underpinnings.”30  
Justice Souter concludes that evidence may be used by the prosecu-
tion “as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an inference of 
guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would be morally 
reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of a defen-
dant’s legal fault.”31
 26 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 27 John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a Story: 
Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1069, 1100 (2007); Richard O. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and 
a Supreme Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 16 
(2002); Menashe & Shamash, supra note 17, at 37, n.133; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 
606–07; Risinger, supra note 15, at 1306; D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, 
Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”—Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heart-
strings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 456 (1998); Simon, supra note 17, at 565–67. 
 28 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 (1997). 
 29 Id. at 187. 
 30 Id. at 187–88. 
 31 Id. at 188. 
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An evidentiary fact’s “narrative integrity” also enhances its pro-
bative value because, according to the Old Chief opinion, jurors come 
to the courthouse with a storehouse of expectations “about what 
proper proof should be.”32  Justice Souter asserts that evidence de-
scribing “a train of events naturally related” will raise jurors’ expecta-
tion that they should learn about “every ingredient of that natural se-
quence the same way.”33  Although the “trains” or “sequences of 
events” that prosecutors prove to juries are by no means natural,34 
they may raise expectations based on the narrative sequence that the 
prosecution constructs at trial.  Jurors have expectations that a “com-
plete” story is based on socially constructed narratives about human 
goals and motivations, crimes and crime detection, etc., and it is 
these frameworks by which jurors attach significance to the prosecu-
tion’s lines of proof. Gaps in such frameworks would disappoint ju-
rors and, under the reasoning in Old Chief, would weaken the proba-
tive force of the prosecution’s case.  Items of evidence may thus take 
on added value under narrative theory simply because they add nar-
rative integrity; they help to tell a “complete” story that has a better 
chance of satisfying the jury’s expectations.35
In the Old Chief opinion, this discussion of evidentiary richness 
and narrative integrity had as its foil a criminal defendant’s request to 
stipulate to his status as a convicted felon.  The Court rejected the 
prosecution’s argument that it should be able to prove that status 
through specific evidence of the type of crime committed by the de-
fendant and held that the stipulation as to status had to be ac-
cepted.36  Ironically, therefore, Justice Souter’s opinion rejected the 
application of the concepts of evidentiary richness and narrative in-
tegrity that it had just described. 
However, the broadened definition of probative value set forth 
in such detail in Old Chief, and the opinion’s implicit reliance on nar-
rative theory to support it, have potentially far-reaching consequences 
for evidence law that have begun to be explored in legal commen-
 32 Id. at 188. 
 33 Id. at 188–89 (emphasis added).  I emphasize the Justice’s use of the word 
natural  to underscore my disagreement with it.  See infra note 34. 
 34 A party’s proof of a sequence of events certainly does not exist in nature; it is 
highly constructed by the demands of the adversary system, the rules of evidence, 
and the availability of evidentiary material.  Nor do sequences of events trigger ex-
pectations in the minds of jurors because nature has planted them there. 
 35 The importance of “completeness” in the theory of how jurors choose the best 
story of “what happened” is described in Part IV.C., infra. 
 36 Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190–92. 
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tary.37  Creative legal arguments are being mounted that take both of 
these concepts beyond the application of FRE 403.38  This Article con-
tends that a defendant’s post-crime state of mind hearsay adds both 
evidentiary richness and narrative integrity to a defendant’s version of 
“what happened” in addition to its linear effect on the state of mind 
element of the crime.  Thus its heightened probative value justifies 
admission under narrative theory, as well as under the categorical 
approach of FRE 803(3), despite the prosecutor’s concern that it ap-
peared to be “a classic false exculpatory statement.” 
DiMaria’s specific statement (“I only came here to get cigarettes 
real cheap”) would bring “evidentiary richness” to the defense narra-
tive.  In Old Chief, Justice Souter identified the core issues in a crimi-
nal case as “the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged 
with thinking and doing to commit the current offense.”39  It is on 
these core issues, according to the opinion, that the prosecution is 
free to offer evidence that forms an eventful, colorful narrative, full 
of rich descriptive detail.  DiMaria’s statement addresses the same 
core issues—what he is charged with knowing and thinking.  It is his 
own statement, proved through the testimony of the arresting FBI of-
ficer.  It is specific, colorful and adds detail (“I thought you guys were 
just investigating white collar crime; what are you doing here?”) that 
humanizes DiMaria.  Were the hearsay statement excluded, DiMaria’s 
story would be impoverished.  Whether its ultimate effect would be to 
DiMaria’s benefit or detriment is up to the jury. 
A defense story also requires narrative integrity and should have 
the opportunity to meet the expectations of the jury.  If DiMaria 
really believed the cigarettes were bootleg, a jury might well expect 
that he would have said so when he was arrested.  Were the hearsay 
statement excluded, the jurors’ expectations might be disappointed.  
DiMaria’s own explanation of his mental state would either be erased 
(if he did not testify), or rendered less convincing because of this 
narrative gap. 
 37 Courts have not, however, read the opinion to require the prosecution to ac-
cept a stipulation other than the “convicted felon” status issue involved in Old Chief 
itself. 
 38 See, e.g., Blume, Johnson & Paavola, supra note 27, at 1099–1103 (incorporating 
the right to tell a plausible story into the right to present third party guilt evidence); 
Mitchell, supra note 17, at 620 (proposing that appellate courts “evaluate the impact 
of withheld information [in violation of Brady v. Maryland] by assessing the addi-
tional and/or alternative stories which could have been told in closing argument 
with the withheld information”). 
 39 Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191. 
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B. The Story Model’s Criteria for Choosing the Best Fitting Story 
The story model of jury decision-making, developed primarily by 
Professors Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, posits that during and 
after story construction at trial, factfinders choose the story that best 
fits the evidence presented since “[m]ore than one story may be con-
structed by the juror.”40  Their research has revealed several criteria 
that factfinders use to make this choice, and that also determine fact-
finders’ level of confidence in that story.  These criteria include cov-
erage (the extent to which the story accounts for the evidence), co-
herence (consistency, plausibility, and completeness), and 
uniqueness (more than one coherent explanation reduces confi-
dence in any one story).41  Plausibility means that the factfinder is 
likely to accept a story that “corresponds to the decision maker’s 
knowledge about what typically happens in the world.”42  Complete-
ness means that the expected structure of the story “has all of its 
parts.”43  If there is “[m]issing information, or lack of plausible infer-
ences,”44 or if a story’s episodes fail to hang together due to the jury’s 
lack of belief in an actor’s “motives, plans and intentions,”45 a story 
will be less complete and less convincing. 
The criteria of plausibility and completeness support the analysis 
of probative value made in Old Chief discussed above.  To persuade 
the jury to choose their story, the adversaries need to offer detailed 
facts, including background and context about the central events and 
central actors.  It could not be known for certain ex ante what evi-
dence would satisfy the factfinder’s expectations of a “complete” 
story, nor which facts would trigger those inferences which corre-
spond to the ways in which the factfinders view, and have experi-
enced, events in the real world.  Therefore, evidence that passes a 
 40 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 527. 
 41 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’ 
Reflections on The People of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 957, 960–61 (1996).  A related theory of story selection—the “parallel constraint 
satisfaction model of explanatory coherence”—is presented in Robbennolt, Darley, 
and MacCoun, supra note 21, at 1151–52: “[D]ecision makers ‘construct an interpre-
tation that fits with the available information better than alternative interpretations.’” 
(quoting PAUL THAGARD, COHERENCE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 16 (2000)).  The au-
thors note that this theory “is consistent with psychological understanding of juror 
decision making” such as the story model, and that their “[c]onnectionist model[] 
provide[s] a formal structure for the mechanism by which the coherence of different 
stories is evaluated.”  Id. at 1152–53. 
 42 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 528. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 41, at 961. 
 45 Id. 
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minimum threshold of probability to affect jurors’ expectations of a 
complete and plausible story should be admitted under narrative 
theory.46
DiMaria’s statement to the FBI agent could be the kind of thing 
a juror would expect an innocent person to say upon arrest.  Con-
versely, the statement could strike some jurors as self-serving and 
likely to be false.  It would diminish the effective operation of the 
story model if courts admitted evidence supportive of only one side’s 
story for evaluation by the jury. 
C. Narrative Theory Assumes that Factfinders Will Decide Between 
Competing Narratives or Stories 
The adversary system structures adjudicatory decision-making 
such that, in most litigated cases, there are at least two competing 
narratives offered to the factfinder during the course of a trial.  These 
narratives are made up of conflicting ways to view the evidence pre-
sented and alternative inferences drawn from that evidence.  Narra-
tives among jurors can differ because jurors bring with them differing 
experiences and generalized knowledge about how the world works 
and about what makes a complete narrative.  Competing narratives 
can be triggered by contradictory arguments made by the party op-
ponents, or can be developed by the jurors themselves. 
Commentators emphasize the function that conflicting narra-
tives perform in jury decision-making.  They require the jury to 
choose, and thus to employ the selection criteria discussed in Part 
IV.B. 
In trials . . . jurors generally confront a body of undisputed evi-
dence which has been contextualized within two competing sto-
ries about the crime (the central action) in dispute.  The jurors 
know that both of the stories cannot be true, and their task is to 
find the one that assimilates the known facts more completely, 
more consistently, and with fewer problematic inferences.  The 
“facts”. . . may impose some limits on what a structurally adequate 
story can look like, but . . . there is a remarkable margin of free-
dom available for the symbolization of competing stories about 
the disputed action.47
The competition between stories is seen as crucial to the jury’s role in 
adjudicatory fact finding: 
There is not just one story, or theory of the case, but at least two.  
The doubling of competing stories alerts the jury to the gap be-
 46 See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 47 BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 90. 
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tween any human event and the telling of it.  It allows the jury to 
begin to assess the relative power of those stories.  One of the axes 
of comparison is which story is more likely to be true, which is 
most consistent with the empirical generalizations that partially 
constitute common sense.48
Not all criminal defendants are able to mount a defense based 
on an alternative story that competes with the prosecution.  Under 
their theory of story construction, Professors Bennett and Feldman 
have identified three defensive strategies for the criminal defendant 
to use at trial.  Only one, the “reconstruction” strategy, requires the 
defendant to tell a story of his own, using his own evidence to provide 
an entirely different explanation for, or “reconstruction of,” his con-
duct.49  The defendant places “the central action in the context of an 
entirely new story to show that it merits a different interpretation.”50  
The advantage of this strategy, Bennett and Feldman assert, is “that it 
often makes judgment in a case dependent on both the structural 
adequacy of the original prosecution story and the ability of the 
prosecution to demonstrate structural problems in the defense 
case.”51
Professor Ronald Allen has described the choice between com-
peting narratives as determining “the relative plausibility of the par-
 48 Robert P. Burns, Fallacies on Fallacies: A Reply, 2 INT’L COMMENT. EVID. (2006) 
[hereinafter Burns, Fallacies on Fallacies].  In other writing, Professor Burns empha-
sizes that all of the structures of the adversarial trial—two theories of the case, two 
opening arguments, cross-examination, rebuttal cases, and closing argument—
“recognize that it is only relative weight that needs to be determined during trial.”  
Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 69, 74 (2001) 
[hereinafter Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law]. 
 49 Bennett & Feldman, supra note 16, at 98–107.  The other two strategies, chal-
lenge and redefinition, may not require the defendant to put on an affirmative case.  
Using the “challenge” strategy, the defendant challenges the coherence of the prose-
cution’s story, typically by showing that key story elements are missing or by showing 
that the evidence only poorly supports these elements.  For example, in cases where 
the only disputed issue is the identity of the perpetrator, the defendant does not of-
fer a complete, highly contextualized narrative of “what happened” but instead at-
tempts to demonstrate the weakness of the prosecution’s story of “who done it.”  This 
strategy, Bennett and Feldman write, “seldom requires the defense to put on a case, 
and it is generally developed through cross-examination and closing statements.”  Id. 
at 98.  Using the “redefinition” strategy, the defendant reinterprets an ambiguous 
element in the prosecution’s story that is closely related to the “meaning of the cen-
tral action.”  Id. at 102.  Redefinition permits a different story meaning—
innocence—to emerge.  For example, the defendant’s presence at the scene of a 
crime might be redefined simply by a different explanation.  The key to this strategy 
is the presence of real ambiguity in the story element and its centrality to the story of 
guilt. 
 50 Id. at 104. 
 51 Id. at 105. 
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ties’ cases.” 52  In his view, the jurors’ choice of the most plausible 
story is always comparative; it is not a matter of “cardinal probability, 
conceived as a relative frequency or a subjective belief state, of a cer-
tain state of affairs.”53  Professor Allen’s discussion of how a juror 
might determine relative plausibility has much in common with the 
criteria for choosing the story with the best fit developed by Penning-
ton and Hastie: 
The fact-finder is then left with a finite number of stories on the 
field that may be probed for the variables indentified above [co-
herence, consistency, completeness, uniqueness, economy and . . . 
[probability] (and surely others, maybe many others).  That prob-
ing will employ both the evidence and arguments presented, but 
also the background knowledge of the fact-finder.  One hypothe-
sis will emerge as more plausible than the others or the fact-finder 
will identify yet another hypothesis that it believes to be the most 
plausible of the possibilities it considers.54
The important point of the narrative and relative plausibility 
theories for this Article is that both assume there will be competing 
stories for the decision-maker to compare and to test against each 
other.  The use of the word “best” here is thus not intended to carry 
the meaning involved in the epistemological/legal debate over the 
“inference to the best explanation” theory as a stand-in for the civil 
and criminal standards of proof.55  In cases such as DiMaria and those 
discussed in Part VI, defendants offer their own state of mind hearsay 
to prove their innocent state of mind.  They exemplify Professors 
Bennett and Feldman’s reconstruction strategy by presenting com-
petitive, comparative narratives.  According to Professors Bennett and 
Feldman, the existence of competing narratives is crucial because the 
 52 Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 254, 273 (1997) [hereinafter Allen, Rationality].  The relative 
plausibility theory asserts that a criminal defendant cannot “do nothing” at trial and 
hope to be exonerated.  At the very minimum, the defendant needs to provide a 
“plausible case of innocence (even if it is less plausible than that of guilt.)”  Ronald J. 
Allen, The Narrative Fallacy, the Relative Plausibility Theory, and a Theory of the Trial, 5 
INT’L COMMENT. EVID. (2005).  Otherwise the factfinder will convict, as “the only story 
on the field typically will be one of guilt.”  Id.  Presumably Bennett and Feldman’s 
challenge and redefinition strategies could provide the defendant’s “plausible case of 
innocence.”  Id. at 5. 
 53 Allen, Rationality, supra note 52, at 273.  Research on coherence-based reason-
ing also supports the relative plausibility theory’s explanation of juror decision-
making.  See Simon, supra note 17, at 562. 
 54 Allen, Rationality, supra note 52, at 274. 
 55 See Larry Laudan, Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Crimi-
nal Standard of Proof, 11 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 292, 296  (2007) (“The meaning of 
‘best’ here is hotly contested among IBE modellers.”). 
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factfinder’s “testing the result against the other side’s story is what we 
mean ordinarily by being objective and fair.”56
DiMaria’s story tested the prosecution’s theory of the case.  It 
contradicted the government’s story that he knew that the cigarettes 
were stolen.  With his statement, perhaps DiMaria had “a plausible 
case of innocence” to offer the jury.  Without the statement, appar-
ently, he did not.  DiMaria was fortunate that his appeal was decided 
by a court that adhered to the categorical approach to Rule 803(3).  
Criminal defendants in many other federal courts are unable to pre-
sent their own state of mind hearsay to the jury, as Part V will show. 
V. IN PUBLISHED CASE LAW, CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’  
POST-CRIME HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF STATE OF MIND ARE  
VIRTUALLY ALWAYS EXCLUDED UNDER FRE 803(3) 
Suppose that DiMaria had been arrested by the FBI one week af-
ter he had picked up the allegedly stolen cigarettes.  He might have 
said to the FBI agent, “What are you arresting me for?  I’ve only got 
bootleg cigarettes in my trunk!”  This statement would be offered by 
the defense to prove DiMaria’s then-existing state of mind of “knowl-
edge or belief” that the cigarettes were bootleg, not stolen.  It would 
fit within the terms of FRE 803(3).57  The statement would be rele-
vant to prove that DiMaria had that same mental state one week ear-
lier as well, based upon an inference that mental states have continu-
ity both forward and backward in time.58  And, just like the actual 
statement in the DiMaria case, it would be exculpatory on the state of 
mind issue and would support DiMaria’s narrative of innocence. 
However, in most federal courts, DiMaria’s post-crime statement 
of his then-existing state of mind would now be inadmissible.  The 
categorical approach to Rule 803(3) approved in DiMaria has been 
rejected by most federal Circuit Courts of Appeal.  These courts have 
instead adopted a “trustworthiness” approach to FRE 803(3), based 
upon a requirement of “timeliness,” and they apply it to post-crime 
state of mind hearsay of criminal defendants.  It is applied in addition 
to the requirement of contemporaneity between the defendant hav-
 56 BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 64. 
 57 The statement would not be offered to prove the truth of this belief, that the 
cigarettes were in fact bootleg.  Thus, it would not be inadmissible hearsay under the 
exclusionary clause of FRE 803(3). 
 58 “The duration of states of mind or emotion varies with the particular attitudes 
or feelings at issue and with the cause . . . .”  MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 274, at 271.  
The cases cited in the McCormick treatise for this proposition have upheld the use of 
inferences of continuity lasting for several months, but not for years.  Id. at 270–71. 
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ing the mental state and making a statement about it, enforced 
through the “then existing” term of Rule 803(3).  The “timeliness” 
goes further.  It requires contemporaneity among the defendant’s al-
leged crime, the defendant’s state of mind, and the defendant’s 
statement. 
Courts adopting this trustworthiness approach have articulated 
the “timeliness” test as permitting no time for reflection or “no time 
to [reflect and possibly] fabricate or misrepresent . . . thoughts”59 
about the alleged crime.  The “time to reflect” referred to is any time 
lapse between the alleged crime and the making of the hearsay 
statement.  “[T]he passage of time may prompt someone to make a 
deliberate misrepresentation of a former state of mind . . . . [T]he 
requirement [of timeliness ensures] that hearsay evidence be reliable 
in order for it to be admissible under Rule 803(3).”60
The significance of applying the timeliness test to post-crime 
hearsay statements is clear: it permits courts to exclude, as untrust-
worthy, defendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay that otherwise 
fits within FRE 803(3).  Since its first articulation in 1980, this test has 
been adopted by a majority of Circuits in cases that have excluded 
criminal defendants’ post-crime hearsay statements of state of mind.61  
These courts justify their approach based on language in the Advisory 
Committee Note to FRE 803(3) which states that Exception (3) “is es-
sentially a specialized application of Exception (1), presented sepa-
rately to enhance its usefulness and accessibility.”  The Advisory 
Committee Note to Exception (1), covering “present sense impres-
sions” of “an event or condition,” states that it requires “substantial 
contemporaneity of event and statement [in order to] negative the 
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”62
 59 United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 743 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States 
v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1315 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 60 United States v. Naiden, 424 F.3d 718, 722–23 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 61 See United States v. Naiden, 424 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 743 
(5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carmichael, 232 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. LeMaster, 54 F.3d 1224, 1231 (6th Cir. 1995);  United States v. 
Macey, 8 F.3d 462, 467–68 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 
1083 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Harvey, 959 F.2d 1371, 1375 (7th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1130 n.5 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Carter, 910 F.2d 1524, 1530–31 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Faust, 850 F.2d 575, 
585–86 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1315 (7th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 1980).  The petition for certio-
rari in Cianci v. United States, 378 F.3d 71, 97 (1st Cir. 2004) raised the split of au-
thority interpreting Rule 803(3).  The petition was denied, Cianci v. United States , 
126 S.Ct. 421 (2005). 
 62 FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee’s note. 
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I have written elsewhere why I think that adding the timeliness 
test to FRE 803(3) is bad law and bad policy.63  It is bad law because it 
rejects the Federal Rules’ general categorical approach to admitting 
hearsay.  It is bad policy because it in effect adopts its own categorical 
rule excluding criminal defendants’ post-crime statements.  The fed-
eral circuit court opinions first adopting the timeliness test involved 
no other type of hearsay declarant and no other type of statement.64  
In the cases decided during the past ten years, courts assume without 
discussion that criminal defendants have compelling motives to fabri-
cate and to make untrustworthy “self-serving” statements both post-
crime and even while the crime is ongoing.65
It appears from the cases that exclusion of criminal defendants’ 
statements as failing the timeliness test, as untrustworthy because of a 
motive to fabricate, or as self-serving, is based on categorical generali-
zations about the credibility of the criminally accused that are not 
enacted in the FRE.  The “self-serving” nature of hearsay statements is 
not grounds for exclusion under any exception under the Federal 
Rules,66 except for those exceptions that contain an explicit mandate 
to the court to consider the trustworthiness issue on a case-by-case ba-
sis.67  With regard to criminal defendants, a presumption of untrust-
worthiness seems to apply.  Most of the major treatises on evidence 
agree that judgments about the credibility of hearsay declarants, even 
criminal defendants, should be for the jury, and that judicial power 
to exclude for untrustworthiness is not a part of the state of mind ex-
ception.68
 63 Swift, supra note 9, at 647–55. 
 64 See supra note 61. 
 65 See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 291 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 66 MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 270, at 248–49.   
“The term ‘self-serving’ is a misnomer that ought to be interred . . . . 
‘The appropriate rule for the exclusion of a party's declarations offered 
in his own behalf as evidence of the truth of the facts declared is the 
hearsay rule.’  Whether self-serving, neutral, or disserving, a hearsay 
statement that does not fit within one of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule is inadmissible, and the reverse is true.”   
Chestnut v. Ford, 445 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1971) (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 275, at 588 (1954)). 
 67 See FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 803(8), 804(b)(3), 807. 
 68 Professors Saltzburg, Martin, and Capra acknowledge in their Federal Rules of 
Evidence Manual the concern that underlies the trustworthiness approach but assert 
that it is “inappropriate to superimpose a trustworthiness requirement on the provi-
sions of Rule 803(3).”  STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN, & DANIEL J. 
CAPRA, 4 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 803.02[4][d], at 803–30 (9th ed. 
2006).  At the other extreme, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence ignores the problem of le-
gitimacy when it states flatly that to satisfy Rule 803(3) “[t]here must be no suspicious 
circumstances suggesting a motive for the declarant to fabricate or misrepresent his 
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My previous objections to the “timeliness” test also rested on its 
unfairness to individual criminal defendants, due to the risk that it 
could operate as a virtual per se rule of exclusion of any post-crime 
state of mind statement.69  This concern for fairness prompted me to 
examine how consistently criminal defendants’ statements were ex-
cluded under FRE 803(3).  The recently published cases that contain 
significant discussion of FRE 803(3) are analyzed in Tables 1–4.70  
These results confirm that the presumption of exclusion is fully real-
ized in federal case law. 
Of course it is well understood that in criminal cases, appeals are 
only from judgments of conviction.  Convicted criminal defendants 
challenge the rulings of trial courts that exclude their own hearsay 
statements.  From the published cases, we do not know how often de-
fendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay gets admitted.  The pub-
lished decisions by both Circuit and District Courts are the proverbial 
tip of the iceberg.  It would be foolish to think that we could extrapo-
late directly from these cases to understand what trial judges are gen-
erally doing. 
And yet, we have to consider the impact that published case law 
has on the conduct of trials.  Where do District Court judges, prose-
cutors, defense attorneys,  commentators, and treatise writers turn to 
find out what “the law” under FRE 803(3) is?  The published cases 
applying the timeliness test present a remarkable consistency and an 
unmistakable message: defendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay 
is untrustworthy and should be excluded.71
or her thoughts.”  JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 5 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE SECOND EDITION: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, § 803.05(2)(a), at 803–29 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2008).  This 
treatise’s discussion of existing case law ignores the Second Circuit’s strongly and 
consistently articulated view, beginning with DiMaria, that categorical application of 
the state of mind exception is required.  Further, MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 274, at 
267–68 n.8, and CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.38, 
at 819 (3d ed. 2003), report accurately on the case law conflict between the strict 
categorical approach of DiMaria and the trustworthiness approach exemplified by 
the timeliness test.  Both struggle with the problem of legitimacy and resolve it 
somewhat equivocally in favor of the categorical approach. 
 69 My previous research on cases applying California Evidence Code sections 
1250–1252 shows that these rules, which explicitly permit discretionary exclusion of 
state of mind hearsay on grounds of lack of trustworthiness, operate as a per se rule 
of exclusion of criminal defendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay.  Such hearsay 
is excluded even when offered as mitigation evidence in the penalty phase of death 
cases. See Swift, supra note 8, at 628–32. 
 70 This research encompassed the last ten years of federal cases in which discus-
sion of Rule 803(3) merited a Westlaw Headnote.  The Westlaw search yielded 115 
citations, including both appellate and district courts. 
 71 I have made this same point in Swift, supra note 9, at 627–28. 
SWIFT_FINAL 6/4/2008  7:13:14 PM 












































18 1 reversible 
3 harmless 
 
The following Table shows the grounds upon which exclusion of 
criminal defendants’ own post-crime state of mind hearsay was up-
held. 
 
 72 This total includes five criminal cases from military courts of appeal discussing 
state of mind hearsay under the Military Rules of Evidence, which have a state of 
mind hearsay exception identical to FRE 803(3). 
 73 Of these twenty-two statements, sixteen were made post-crime.  Four other 
statements were statements of future intent, one was a pre-crime statement of fear, 
and only one was made during the commission of the alleged crime itself. 
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In the District Courts, the published cases included many more civil 
cases involving the admissibility of state of mind hearsay. 
 
 74 United States v. Rivera-Hernandez, 497 F.3d 71, 80–82 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding 
that the defendant’s statement to his father as to why he was receiving certain pay-
ments offered to show lack of fraudulent intent); United States v. Canales-Fuentes, 
176 F. App’x. 873 (9th Cir. 2006) (defendant’s custodial statement that his plan was 
to visit his brother offered to prove lack of intent to distribute marijuana); United 
States v. Naiden, 424 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that the defendant’s state-
ment to friend that he did not believe the girl he was in contact with on the internet 
was underage, offered to show his lack of intent to transport a minor for unlawful 
sexual purposes); United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 105–06 (1st Cir. 2004) (re-
corded statement showing state of mind not to endorse bribery in his administration, 
offered to rebut allegations of public corruption); United States v. Secor, 73 F. 
App’x. 554, 566 (4th Cir. 2003) (statement by defendant to his employee to tell the 
truth to the IRS offered to prove he had not  knowingly and willfully prepared and 
filed false tax returns on behalf of his client); United States v. Feng, 25 F. App’x. 635, 
642 (9th Cir. 2002) (statement by defendant to his sister on boat smuggling illegal 
aliens after he discovered the human cargo, offered to show he was frightened and 
shocked and to show he did not knowingly and voluntarily further the conspiracy to 
bring aliens into the U.S.); United States v. Bishop, 291 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 
2002) (defendants’ statements of intent to their accountant that they would report 
money received as income, offered to prove lack of willfulness in conspiring to de-
fraud the IRS and attempted tax evasion); United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 974 
(7th Cir. 2001) (defendant’s recorded statement showing an exculpatory state of 
mind to prove he did not knowingly accept a bribe); United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 
722, 743 (5th Cir. 2001) (defendant’s statement of plan to scam the people entrap-
ping him offered to show lack of intent to accept illegal kickbacks); United States v. 
Wilson, 103 F.3d 1402, 1405 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s pre-crime statement of why 
he was going to airport offered to show lack of intent to engage in drug dealing). 
The Bishop and Wilson opinions demonstrate that courts exclude defendants’ state-
ments of intent for being “self-serving” and untrustworthy even when made during 
an alleged conspiracy, Bishop, 291 F.3d at 1110, or before the alleged crime, Wilson, 
103 F.3d at 1405. 
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Tables 1 and 3 show 27 instances of defendants offering their 
own state of mind hearsay; 20 of these are post-crime statements.  Ta-
bles 2 and 4 show that while untrustworthiness and the “timeliness” 
test are not the only grounds upon which defendants’ post-crime 
state of mind statements are excluded, they are the dominant reason.  
Some mistaken exclusions are inevitable because the application of 
FRE 803(3) raises challenging analytic issues.  The systematic exclu-
sion of state of mind hearsay as untrustworthy because not timely, was 
made with a motive to fabricate, or was self-serving, is a different 
phenomenon.  It is grounded, in my view, in an unjustifiable inter-
 
 75 Four of these five statements were made post-crime; one was a statement of fu-
ture intent. 
 76 United States v. Kemp, 362 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594–95 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (evidence 
of state of mind offered to show “consciousness of innocence” to rebut government’s 
use of evidence to prove “consciousness of guilt”); United States v. Davidson, 308 F. 
Supp. 2d 461, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (defendant’s self-serving “version of what took 
place months earlier . . . is not reliable evidence of Davidson’s state of mind”); 
United States v. Giles, 67 F.Supp.2d 947, 953–54 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (defendant’s re-
corded statement showing an exculpatory state of mind to prove he did not know-
ingly accept a bribe). 
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pretation of FRE 803(3).77  And in the published cases, it is an inter-
pretation that applies almost exclusively, and almost without fail, to 
criminal defendants. 
VI. PUBLISHED CASE LAW SHOWS THE  
IMPORTANCE OF DEFENDANTS’ POST-CRIME  
STATE OF MIND HEARSAY WITHIN NARRATIVE THEORY 
Parts III and IV have explained in theoretical terms why defen-
dants’ own state of mind hearsay would be important evidence at 
trial.  The DiMaria case was used to illustrate this explanation.  Two 
brief examples from the cases in Tables 2 and 4 above further dem-
onstrate that exclusion of defendants’ post-crime hearsay impover-
ishes their narrative and places in jeopardy the effective presentation 
of competing alternative stories for the jury’s decision-making. 
In United States v. Secor, defendant Dougherty, a tax attorney and 
CPA, was charged with willfully preparing and filing a false tax return 
for a client. 78  The defendant offered taped recordings of statements 
that he had made to an employee, telling the employee “to tell the 
truth” to the IRS.79  These statements, showing his then-existing state 
of mind of wanting the truth to be revealed, were offered to prove his 
lack of willfulness in committing the tax law violations charged.80  Al-
though the statements were relevant and would have been admissible 
under a categorical reading of FRE 803(3), the court upheld exclu-
sion of defendant’s statements because of his motive to exculpate and 
lack of timeliness:  
[H]e was aware that he was under investigation by the IRS and 
that his employee had an appointment to meet with IRS agents 
later that day.  Given the circumstances under which [defendant] 
made these statements, therefore, the district court properly ex-
cluded this evidence because [he] had time to reflect and fabri-
cate.81
In United States v. Reyes, defendant Reyes, a city councilman, was 
charged with accepting kickbacks on city contracts.82  The kickback 
was offered to Reyes as part of an elaborate sting operation mounted 
 77 Justifying the exclusion of statements of future intent as harmless because they 
were “self-serving,” or as a general matter of “discretion,” is also contrary to the cate-
gorical approach of FRE 803(3).  See, e.g., Bishop, 291 F.3d at 1110; Wilson, 103 F.3d at 
1406. 
 78 Secor, 73 F. App’x. at 566. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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against him by the FBI.  In addition to an “entrapment” defense, 
Reyes contended that “the things he did and said during the [FBI] 
investigation were part of his secret plan to ‘scam the scammers’”—
that is, those who were working to lure him into the kickback scheme.  
He offered into evidence a conversation that had been tape recorded 
by the FBI between himself and his co-defendant.  Reyes claimed that 
this conversation reflected his continuing state of mind to conduct 
this plan.  The district court’s exclusion of the recording was upheld 
on appeal on the grounds that the statements were subsequent to 
Reyes’s acts in accepting the kickbacks and that Reyes’s suspicions 
about his co-defendant and his likely understanding that his conver-
sations were being monitored “makes it probable that Reyes’s re-
corded remarks were more self-serving than they were candid, and 
therefore their probative value is greatly diminished.”83
In both Secor and Reyes, it may be that the factfinder would have 
mistrusted the defendants’ evidence showing their innocent state of 
mind, and might ultimately have chosen the story of defendants’ guilt 
as more plausible.  But under narrative theory, the meaning of de-
fendants’ statements would have been evaluated within the context of 
larger narrative frameworks.  The defendants’ motives to make self-
serving statements would not totally disqualify their statements from 
consideration.  The words used in the recorded statements them-
selves, for example, might have been persuasive due to their immedi-
acy and concreteness, even more persuasive than the defendants’ tes-
timony given in court.  In Secor, the jury might have wondered what, if 
anything, Dougherty had said to his employee before the IRS inter-
view.  And in Reyes, the jury might have wondered if Reyes had ever 
shared his “scam” plan with his co-defendant.  Without the post-crime 
statements, the plausibility and completeness of defendants’ alterna-
tive stories were weakened. 
Occasionally courts have recognized the importance that post-
crime statements of state of mind can have for the defense.  United 
States v. Giles involved the conviction of a Chicago alderman for ac-
cepting cash bribes from a government mole and for extorting cash 
 83 Id. at 743.  The appellate court also commented that the district court could 
have concluded that too long a time lapse between the statement and the last crimi-
nal act (four months) substantially reduced the probative value “with respect to 
Reyes’ then-existing mental state,” meaning, I think, there was little likelihood of 
continuity between past and present state of mind.  Id.  Disruption of the necessary 
continuity backward or forward in time, because of lapse of time or other events, 
would be a ground for exclusion independent of trustworthiness.  But see 
MCCORMICK, supra note 2; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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from a company operating in his ward.84  The state of mind element 
required proof that the money was taken “knowing or believing” that 
it was “in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official 
power.”85  Defendant sought the admission of taped conversations be-
tween himself and the government informant.  Giles claimed that the 
contents of the recording showed an exculpatory then-existing men-
tal state; the District Court excluded the tape because the three-week 
interval between the act of accepting the first payment and the taped 
conversation “left too much time for reflection and fabrication by 
Giles” and was not admissible to show his mental state.86  The Circuit 
Court declined to reverse this ruling as “so outside the zone of rea-
sonableness so as to be an abuse of discretion,” but it did think it 
would have been better to have admitted the tape: 
     We think the . . . tape should have been admitted, especially in 
this case where Giles was going to (and did) testify.  The govern-
ment’s argument that the tape was a product of Giles’ reflec-
tion—an attempt to cover his tracks in case he got caught—
should have been made to the jury, not the judge.  On a close 
evidentiary call like this, we think it’s best to err on the side on in-
clusion . . . .87
Two points are notable in this analysis.  The court’s acknowledge-
ment that the trustworthiness of hearsay is for the jury, not the judge, 
underlies the narrative theory of decision-making.88  The court also 
understands that the fact that Giles testified does not reduce the im-
pact or importance of the post-crime hearsay statement; in fact, it 
makes the hearsay more important.  Giles was not using hearsay to 
hide from cross-examination but to add to the plausibility of his 
competing narrative account. 
VII. THE LARGER STORY 
This Article highlights an obstacle that FRE 803(3) places in the 
way of criminal defendants trying to construct a complete and plausi-
ble narrative for the jury.  It has concluded that putting an end to the 
 84 Unites States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 85 Id. at 973. 
 86 Id. at 974. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Making a similar point, the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals 
overturned the exclusion of defendant’s statement that he was “just kidding,” made 
three days after a highly inculpatory admission.  The court wrote that “arguments 
that an accused’s exculpatory state-of-mind comments are merely self-serving are bet-
ter left to the argument of counsel than used to exclude evidence.”  United States v. 
Benson, 48 M.J. 734, 741 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). 
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“timeliness test” which courts have injected into this rule would per-
mit criminal defendants to use their own post-crime state of mind 
hearsay to construct such a story. 
Two other Articles in this Symposium share this same concern 
for defendants’ narratives, focusing on different evidentiary obstacles.  
Professor Keith Findley presents a compelling argument that many 
criminal defendants lack the ability to present “serious adversary test-
ing of forensic sciences” due to lack of access to forensic laboratories 
and lack of adequate resources to conduct rigorous scrutiny of, or 
challenge to, the prosecution’s data and conclusions.89  This impover-
ishes their ability to construct a competing narrative on the issue of 
identity, whether that narrative is a fully complete alternative story of 
“who did it” or a plausible hypothesis of innocence.  Professor Chris-
topher Slobogin’s concern is that criminal defendants are also com-
petitively disadvantaged by the difficulty under the Daubert standards 
of obtaining expert testimony on the issue of “state of mind.”  He 
proposes that 
we should be willing to contemplate a relaxed evidentiary thresh-
old for opinion testimony about mental states that determine 
criminal culpability because we simply cannot ascertain what they 
are, at least in the same rigorous way we can use scientific meth-
ods to figure out whether a person committed a particular act.90
He grounds this proposal on the argument of necessity91 and on 
criminal defendants’ “constitutionally-based right to voice—a right to 
tell their story in the most effective way possible.”92
 89 Findley, supra note 12, at 929.  Professor Findley advocates “less case-by-case, 
single-judge assessment of complex forensic science, and more reliance on expert 
panels of scientists” as well as “the creation of a national forensic science institute or 
advisory committees designed to assist courts in accurately assessing forensic sciences, 
and in some cases supplanting the adversary case-by-case process for addressing con-
cerns about such sciences.”  Id. at 897. 
 90 Christopher Slobogin, Experts, Mental States, and Acts,  38 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1009, 1012 (2008). 
 91 The inability to obtain Daubert-worthy expertise is based not only on the “con-
structed” nature of the state of mind issue, but also the flawed ability of science to 
“measure” these states of mind and to construct any experiments that would test 
these measurements.  Id. 
 92 Id. at 1017.  The basis for the right to voice is 
the right to testify, which stems from the Fifth Amendment and the 
due process clause, and on the Sixth Amendment rights to confront 
accusers, present evidence, and have one’s charges considered by a 
(fully informed) jury. . . . Others have argued that the compulsory 
process clause incorporates a fair process rationale that entitles the de-
fendant to present any evidence that is material to her case, and that 
the right to jury trial would be undermined if lay people are not given 
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These three evidentiary obstacles—criminal defendants’ lack of 
access at trial to their own post-crime state of mind hearsay, to ade-
quate testing and adversarial scrutiny of forensic material, and to le-
gitimate expert knowledge pertinent to their past mental states —can 
be analyzed within the traditional norms of evidence law and due 
process.  Traditional concerns about accuracy of decision-making, 
adversarial fairness, special regard for the interests of criminal defen-
dants as against the advantages enjoyed by the government, all leav-
ened by increasing demand for efficiency in the prosecution of 
crime, could be marshaled to persuade the relevant audiences of law-
yers, judges, legislators, and academics that something should be 
done. 
If so, what do the insights gained in this Article from the applica-
tion of basic principles of narrative theory93 to defendants’ post-crime 
state of mind hearsay accomplish?  These insights could be viewed as 
simply additive, casting in new terms the same traditional concerns: 
accuracy (freeing the jury’s choice of story from the constraint of ju-
dicially-imposed generalizations about criminal defendants’ untrust-
worthiness), fairness and special regard for defendants’ interests pit-
ted against the advantages enjoyed by the government (ensuring 
defendants’ ability to participate fully in narrative construction after 
Old Chief  opened that door to the prosecution), and efficiency (re-
vealing that post-crime statements can be proved efficiently as they 
are typically recorded, made to police, or spoken to companions).  
But to the extent that narrative theory presents us with new and valid 
understanding of a crucial component of juror decision-making, ar-
guments based on this theory are more than just new words.  They 
can make a significant and persuasive contribution to on-going de-
bates about these core values of evidence law.94 
the opportunity to consider whether the defendant’s story, however 
fantastic on the surface, may nonetheless ultimately be plausible. 
Id.  
 93 In Part IV, these basic principles were distilled from the Old Chief opinion, 
from empirically-based descriptions of the use of narrative frameworks at trial, and 
from the highly theorized writings about relative plausibility. 
 94 Professor Findley suggests that other evidentiary obstacles limit defendants’ 
ability to construct a complete narrative.  For example, impeachment by felony con-
victions under FRE 609 and the Supreme Court opinions applying it, see, e.g., Ohler v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000), keeps criminal defendants off the witness stand.  
The requirement of corroboration burdens defendants’ use of the “against penal in-
terest” hearsay exception under FRE 804(b)(3) to prove that another person may 
have committed the charged crime.  Findley, supra note 12, at 926.  These problems 
could also benefit from scrutiny under the lens of narrative theory. 
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Taken even further, the insights from narrative theory might 
fundamentally challenge evidence law and our system of trial.  Pro-
posals for restructuring civil and criminal trials have already emerged 
from understanding and accepting what narrative theory tells us 
about how juries make decisions.  In his writing about relative plausi-
bility, Professor Allen has proposed placing an affirmative burden on 
civil defendants.  They would be required to respond to plaintiffs’ 
specific allegations “with equally specific and affirmative allegations 
rather than with simple denials.”95  Parties would be required to assert 
“what they believe are the most likely sequences of events leading to 
the event in question” followed by “instructing the jury to choose be-
tween them.”96  Professor Michael Risinger has proposed a tracking 
system for those criminal cases in which defendants raise only claims 
of “factual innocence” based, for example, on a claim of mistaken 
identity.97  Special rules of evidence and procedure would be em-
ployed for “factual innocence” cases,98 precluding the prosecution’s 
use of the kinds of prejudicial evidence that may be justified by narra-
tive theory, and was discussed approvingly in Old Chief, when norma-
tive issues are at stake. 99
What about the law of evidence?  The conclusion reached in this 
Article—that criminal defendants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay 
would be viewed as highly probative under narrative theory, whereas 
a majority of federal courts view it as so untrustworthy that it cannot 
be admitted at trial—poses two challenges for evidence law.  One 
challenge is that narrative theory may generate arguments for some-
thing closer to a “free proof” regime that would require abandon-
ment of many of the exclusionary principles of our current law.  The 
 95 Ronald J. Allen, Theories of Inference and Adjudication: A Reconceptualization of 
Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 426 (1986). 
 96 Id. at 426–27.  Allen also postulates that understanding jury decision-making in 
terms of narrative and relative plausibility theories will lead to “increased juror in-
volvement at trial” and “[b]urdens of persuasion [entering] into the process only as 
conclusions rather than as the focus of deliberation.”  Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambi-
guity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 633 (1994). 
 97 Risinger, supra note 15, at 1311 (“Most criminal trials with a chance of acquittal 
involve either the binary fact of identity . . . or occasionally the true-fact claim that no 
actus reus occurred . . . .”). 
 98 Id. at 1311–13.  He also proposes the adoption of the “unsafe verdict” standard 
of appellate review.  Id. at 1331–33. 
 99 Risinger contends that, in factual innocence cases, “‘thick description,’ ‘narra-
tive context,’ and ‘partisan adversary rhetoric’ are more likely to undermine than to 
promote both proper decision and legitimacy.”  Id. at 1301.  He acknowledges the 
importance of these types of evidence for “explicitly normative” issues and for those 
issues, like state of mind, which have “normative warrant” or benefit from factually 
rich context.  Id. at 1299–1301, 1306–07. 
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second challenge is that courts may exclude criminal defendants 
wholesale from the benefits that evidentiary policies based on narra-
tive theory will bestow on the prosecution.  Both challenges will be 
discussed briefly. 
Professor Robert P. Burns asserts that the jury needs more in-
formation at trial, rather than less, to particularize, qualify, and refine 
the common sense generalizations that jurors use in the process of 
deciding cases: 
[T]he use of narrative structures at trial is not only inevitable, but 
epistemically warranted, and the trial itself contains powerful and 
flexible means to counter the real limitations of those structures  
. . . . I have also questioned the power of exclusionary rules to 
counter those limitations in a reliable way. 100
According to Professor Burns, the adversarial structure of trial allows 
the jury to assess the relative power of competing stories,101 and 
“[o]ne of the axes of comparison is which story is more likely to be 
true, . . . [that is,] more consistent with the empirical generalizations 
that partially constitute common sense.”102  Therefore, the limits that 
he would place on the admissibility of evidence are few: only “direct 
testimony in the language of perception[,] . . . full foundations as to 
the sources of testimony[,] . . . [and] some concept of materiality.”103
This concept of “freer” proof might change evidence law dra-
matically, but it would not undermine the fundamental premise of 
our system, that is, that the rules of evidence and structure of trial 
should vindicate the principles and norms of substantive law.  Profes-
sor Burns acknowledges, that “[m]ateriality ensures that the evidence 
presented have some relationship to the norms expressed in the jury 
instructions and so in the substantive law.”104  Thus the goals of narra-
tive theory appear to be that jurors make the best use of their gener-
alized knowledge or common sense in understanding the case before 
them, and that they recognize and respect the “judgment of the 
community embedded in the law of rules.”105  These are also the goals 
 100 Burns, Fallacies on Fallacies, supra note 48, at 6. 
 101 The means of countering the limitations of the jury’s narrative structures in-
clude the “two theories of the case” presented in opening statements “in quick suc-
cession,” cross-examination, rebuttal cases, and closing argument.  Id. at 74. 
 102 Id. at 2. 
 103 Id. at 6. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 7. 
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of current evidence law, although there is significant disagreement 
about how best to accomplish them.106
This disagreement is exemplified in the conclusion reached in 
this Article.  Current interpretation of hearsay law excludes defen-
dants’ post-crime state of mind hearsay on the theory that the hearsay 
exceptions promote reliability, whereas narrative theory could find 
such evidence highly probative.  Twenty years ago I advocated a re-
conception of the problem posed by hearsay evidence and proposed 
a solution which I called the “foundation fact approach.”107  Although 
I clearly did not advocate “free proof,”108  I see now that the theory of 
“operational accuracy,” which I espoused as an alternative to the “re-
liability” approach of the FRE, has some close ties to narrative theory.  
As I defined it, operational accuracy “claims that accuracy [in jury de-
cision-making] is maximized by the trier’s ability to apply its own 
generalizations about reality to determine the probative value of evi-
dence.”109  That is, the jury’s evaluation of an item of hearsay will be 
more “accurate” if the jury has more information about the hearsay 
declarant’s perception, memory, and making of the hearsay state-
ment.  It is this information that would particularize, qualify, and re-
fine those generalizations about the declarant’s credibility that reflect 
the jury’s knowledge and experience of the world.  I argued that op-
erational accuracy, rather than filtering hearsay through an external, 
pre-existing and FRE-imposed or judge-imposed set of substantive 
generalizations about what kind of hearsay is reliable, should be the 
goal of hearsay policy. 
 106 Critics of “free proof” are concerned about rejecting exclusionary rules that 
focus on protecting parties from the danger of unfair prejudice.  Without such rules, 
they foresee greater risks of inaccurate stereotyping and of undue reliance on hege-
monic stories that would severely disadvantage minority and less powerful segments 
of society at trial.  See Menashe & Shamash, supra note 17, at 24–28.  These authors 
contend that the admissibility of evidence should be reviewed atomistically, on an 
item by item basis, and should exclude “evidence whose probative value is out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect.”  Doron Menashe & Hamutal Esther Shamash, Pass 
These Sirens By: Further Thoughts on Narrative and Admissibility Rules, 8 INT’L COMMENT. 
EVID. (2007). 
 107 Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1341 
(1987). 
 108 The goal of the foundation fact approach was to present hearsay statements to 
the jury only when certain information about the declarant, provided by a knowl-
edgeable foundation witness, was available.  This contextual information about the 
declarant and her circumstances when perceiving, remembering, and speaking about 
the content of her hearsay statement, would enable the jury to evaluate the statement 
more effectively.  Id. at 1355–61. 
 109 Id. at 1350–51. 
SWIFT_FINAL 6/4/2008  7:13:14 PM 
1006 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:975 
 
If I were to re-frame the terms of this claim under narrative the-
ory, it would be that the relevance of a hearsay statement is con-
structed; that information about the declarant’s perceiving, remem-
bering and making a statement would provide evidentiary material 
for one or more narratives about the declarant which would lead to 
one or more alternative interpretations of the statement itself.  These 
alternative meanings would in turn contribute to, and be evaluated 
by, the jury’s larger developing narrative framework based on all of 
the evidence available at trial. 
I also see now that a significant drawback to the foundation fact 
approach and its promise of rich and complex narratives about all 
hearsay declarants is that it threatens information overload.  This 
same drawback applies to the argument for “free proof.”  And it may 
well apply to any argument that justifies the admissibility of evidence 
on the theory of narrative relevance, a theory which seems un-
bounded.  The jury could be overwhelmed with ever more colorful, 
ever more concrete, and ever more contextual data that will have to 
be processed at trial.  Professor Craig Callen has described this prob-
lem: 
Research on informal reasoning, the inferential methods based 
on common experience that human beings employ in litigation as 
well as everyday life, suggests that it would be a serious mistake to 
require that courts admit evidence with non-zero probative value 
as long as the associated costs did not substantially outweigh the 
value. . . . [M]inimal relevancy sets a standard that is too low.  
Conceptions of informal reasoning often implicitly assume that 
we have unrealistic mental abilities and unlimited resources for 
decision-making.110
So if the project of applying narrative theory to on-going debates 
about evidence law proceeds, it will be important to consider neces-
sary and effective limits to the admission of more and more evidence 
on the ground that it makes a complete and plausible story. 
For criminal defendants, there is however an antecedent chal-
lenge to existing evidence law posed by the findings of this Article—
whether courts will use narrative theory, and the concomitant con-
cept of narrative relevance, in the defendant’s favor at all.  Does Old 
Chief validate the defendant’s need to tell a “morally” compelling story?  
Will that opinion’s valuation of evidence for its evidentiary richness 
and narrative integrity be applied even-handedly to criminal defen-
dants? 
 110 Craig R. Callen, Rationality and Relevancy: Conditional Relevancy and Constrained 
Resources, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243, 1258–59 (2003). 
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Take as an example United States v. Alexander,111 discussed by Pro-
fessor Slobogin in his book Proving the Unprovable.112  In Alexander, de-
fense evidence of the defendant’s “rotten social background,” and of 
his community filled with “explosive racial tensions,” was held inad-
missible under the medical model of insanity and diminished capac-
ity.113  What if the defense had framed this evidence not within the 
medical model but simply as evidence of the lack of the requisite state 
of mind, here “malice”?  Would evidence of defendant’s background 
then be admitted to help the factfinder construct a different state of 
mind, or to tell a more persuasive story of innocence? It seems 
unlikely.  As Professor James J. Duane has pointed out, putting the 
“human face” of the defendant on the issue of reasonable doubt 
would not be given serious consideration by any American judge be-
cause “it would mark . . . a profound break with our conception of 
the parameters of a criminal trial.”114
This Article has addressed a far narrower issue of even-handed 
treatment of defense evidence within narrative theory.  It has con-
cluded that defendants’ own post-crime state of mind hearsay is 
highly probative and would permit them in many cases to construct a 
more plausible alternative story of their innocent state of mind.  Cur-
rent case law that rejects defendants’ access to such proof denies 
them the benefits to be gained from narrative theory’s insights into 
how jurors learn from, and make decisions about, evidence at trial.  
The larger story suggested in this Article and others in this Sympo-
sium, that criminal defendants might reap benefits from even-handed 
judicial recognition of the importance of narrative theory for evi-




 111 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 112 SLOBOGIN, supra note 12, at 30–31. 
 113 Id. 
 114 James J. Duane, “Screw Your Courage to the Sticking-Place”: The Roles of Evidence, 
Stipulations, and Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 469 (1998).  
Criminal defendants are permitted to present their more fully “human faces” to the 
jury only as mitigation evidence, in the sentencing phase of death penalty cases.  And 
for reasons of fairness, the prosecution is now allowed to present personal impact 
statements from victims’ families in exchange. 
